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ABSTRACT

This project involved an investigation of water utility preparedness and best
practices for pandemic influenza. A pandemic could cause serious disruptions to the
operations of critical infrastructure, including drinking water systems. These disruptions
could be caused by staffing shortages, power disruptions, and shortages of chemicals and
other supplies. Ensuring continuity of operations for drinking water systems is crucial to
protect public health and safety, and to the economy of all communities. Literature
searches, interviews, and a survey of Ohio water systems indicated that water systems in
Ohio and across the United States are preparing for pandemic influenza. Pandemic
influenza preparation and response plans for health departments, based on CDC
guidelines, can be easily found online. Business continuity plans and templates for the
development of government agency pandemic influenza plans are also readily accessible.
However, templates for developing pandemic influenza plans for water systems were not
discovered during this investigation. A template pandemic influenza plan for water
systems was developed as a result of this project.

1

I. INTRODUCTION
Flu pandemics in the 20th century occurred in 1918, 1957 and 1968. Public health
and medical experts believe that another flu pandemic could occur at any time (CDC,
2007; Fauci, 2006). Pandemics occur when a virulent influenza virus undergoes genetic
shift and human to human transmission occurs readily. There is concern among public
health officials that the avian influenza virus A (H5N1) could undergo genetic changes
and cause a pandemic (Taubenberg, Morens, & Fauci, 2007 and CDC, 2007). Avian and
human influenza viruses could recombine in intermediate hosts, such as has happened in
pigs, to form new viral strains that are lethal to humans (Greene, 2006).
Avian influenza viruses can spread between wild birds and domestic birds.
Migratory waterfowl can infect other birds directly or through fecal contamination of
water used by domestic birds. Currently, human avian influenza H5N1 cases are
associated with close contact with contaminated chickens and other poultry (WHO,
2008). There is some statistical and laboratory evidence indicating that limited, nonsustained human-human transmission of H5N1 may have occurred (WHO, 2008; Yang et
al., 2007; Uyeke & Bresee, 2007). If H5N1 undergoes genetic shift and becomes easily
transmissible between humans, pandemic influenza could spread rapidly. Because of
increased global commerce and international travel, diseases can now spread rapidly
throughout the world which would likely make a pandemic in the 21 century much more
deadly than in the past.
A Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) study of disease rates for a
new pandemic estimated that in the United States, 40 – 100 million people could be
sickened. The CDC study provided a “most likely estimate” death toll of 89,000 –
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300,000, with “best case” to “worst case” death toll range of 75,000 – 422,000 (CDC,
2007). The World Health Organization uses a “conservative estimate” of 2 – 7.4 million
worldwide deaths for a mild pandemic as in 1957. The number of deaths could be much
higher if a new pandemic had death rates similar to the 1918 pandemic (WHO, 2007).
Avian Influenza virus H5N1 has a high mortality rate. As of January 21, 2008
there were 352 reported human cases of H5N1 influenza world wide with a death rate of
62 %. These cases were mostly confined to Asia with other cases in the Middle East and
Africa. Most of the cases were related to handling or close contact with poultry with the
possibility of some human-human transmission (WHO, 2008).

Figure 1 - World Health Organization - Global Map of H5N1, January 2008
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Response to a modern pandemic would be greatly improved compared to the three
influenza pandemics of the last 100 years. Scientists have a better understanding of
influenza viruses, including H5N1, and host species. It is known that eliminating sick
birds reduces the possibility of transmission of influenza. Anti-viral drugs are available
and there is better knowledge of how to improve vaccines. Antibiotics are available for
secondary infections related to influenza (Greene, 2006).
Since 2005 a great deal of pandemic influenza preparation has been undertaken or
planned by public health agencies, governments, private industries, and public utilities in
the United States. All states were required to develop pandemic influenza plans (U.S.
DHHS, 2006). Vaccine and anti-viral production and research have been accelerated to
meet expected demands.
Recent scientific advances and increased vaccine manufacturing capacity have
prompted experts to increase their projections of how many pandemic influenza vaccine
courses can be made available in the coming years. Last spring, the World Health
Organization (WHO) and vaccine manufacturers reported that about 100 million courses
of pandemic influenza vaccine based on the H5N1 avian influenza strain could be
produced immediately with standard technology. Experts now anticipate that global
production capacity will rise to 4.5 billion pandemic immunization courses per year in
2010. It would take 6.7 billion immunization courses to protect the whole world. In
2007, manufacturers increased production capacity of trivalent (three viral strains)
seasonal influenza vaccines to an estimated 565 million doses, from 350 million doses
produced in 2006 (WHO, 2007).
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Influenza vaccine production is based on monitoring of seasonal and potentially
pandemic influenza viruses. The Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) gathers
influenza virus information from National Influenza Centers (NICs) and WHO
Collaborating Centers. International Health Regulations (IHR) requires member states to
report cases of human influenza that are caused by novel viruses, such as H5N1. In 2004,
the GISN started gathering H5N1 virus information so that the WHO could develop and
provide H5N1 candidate vaccine viruses to vaccine producers. Manufacturers have used
these candidate viruses to produce and test H5N1 vaccines. Production and widespread
distribution of vaccines is critical for the control of influenza. Because of it’s
pathogenicity to eggs and poultry, the development of H5N1 vaccine is more complicated
than the production of seasonal vaccines. Reverse genetics is used to make the virus less
pathogenic so that it can be grown in eggs and produced safely (WHO, 2007).
In April 2007, the United States government approved a pre-pandemic vaccine for
H5N1. According to the national Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan
One Year Summary issued in July 2007, enough pre-pandemic vaccine is available to
treat 6 million people, with plans to stockpile enough pre-pandemic vaccine for 20
million people. Federal and state stockpiles contain enough antiviral medications for 50
million people (U.S. Homeland Security Council, 2007).
In addition to widespread illness and fatalities, a pandemic flu epidemic could
create major disruptions to the global economy. A pandemic could cause up to $800
billion dollars in economic loses world wide (World Bank, 2007). The U.S.
Congressional Budget Office estimated that a modern pandemic with an effect similar to
1918’s pandemic could cause a loss of national income of approximately $600 billion in
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the United States (U.S. Homeland Security Council, 2006). Operations of critical
infrastructure, including drinking water systems, would be greatly affected by staffing
shortages, power disruptions, and shortages of chemicals and other supplies.
There are approximately 160,000 public water systems in the United States,
serving 84% of the nation through the provision of water for domestic, industrial, and
commercial use (U.S. DHS, 2007). Ensuring continuity of operations for drinking water
systems is crucial to maintaining the health and economy of all communities. Water is
necessary for drinking, cooking, fire protection, and basic hygiene. Businesses, factories,
hospitals, clinics and other public health infrastructure need water to maintain operations.
Homes, businesses, and communities are dependent on a continuous supply of water from
public water systems to enable the conveyance and treatment of sewage.
The public health implications are enormous if water suppliers cannot maintain
essential operations. Inadequately treated water could lead to waterborne disease
outbreaks. The largest waterborne disease outbreak in the United States was caused
when heavy spring rains and runoff from animal feedlots combined with treatment plant
changes to cause an outbreak of cryptosporidiosis in Milwaukee in 1993. This outbreak
caused over 400,000 illnesses and at least 40 deaths (Craun & Calderon, 2001).
Sufficient quantities of water at adequate pressure are also needed to fight fires and
prevent backflow contamination of water mains.
In the event of a pandemic flu, community water systems could face critical
shortages of personnel to maintain and operate well fields, intake structures, treatment
plants, pumping stations, and distribution systems. Labor shortages could also affect
water quality testing, vehicle repair, administration, and payroll systems. Influenza
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caused labor shortages in transportation, energy, and other sectors could lead to
insufficient power, parts, general supplies, and water treatment chemicals (Figure 2).
To prepare for labor shortages water utilities need to plan to use “skeleton” teams that
have diverse skills for operations, maintenance and repair. Essential personnel will need
to be identified in advance and protected from illness during pandemics. Operations of
water systems could be disrupted by shortages of essential personnel in many areas
including source conveyance, treatment, distribution, engineering, maintenance, water
quality monitoring and finance/payroll. Contingency plans or systems need to be
developed for alternate sources of chemicals and other supplies, and emergency power.
Water systems need to identify essential functions and critical resources to prepare for
events such as pandemic influenza that can threaten continuity of operations.
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Figure 2 – Example: Employee Absence and Potential Water System Disruptions

Water Source
Staff Shortages

AFFECTED AREA
_________________
Water
Sources

Insufficient supply of
source water.

Water Plant Operators,
Maintenance, and
Laboratory
Staff Shortages

AFFECTED AREA
_________________
Water
Treatment

Inadequately treated
water, Waterborne
Disease Outbreaks.

Water Main Repair
Crews, Pump
Mechanics, and
Sample Collector
Staff Shortages

AFFECTED AREA
_________________
Water
Distribution

Depressurization,
Waterborne Disease
Outbreaks,
Insufficient Water for
Fires

Water Meter Readers,
Revenue Technicians,
and Payroll Employee
Staff Shortages

AFFECTED AREA
_________________
Finance
Administration

Revenue Shortages
Unpaid employees
Unpaid vendors

Water system preparation for pandemic influenza could also include developing
the capacity to generate chemicals on site. It may be necessary to acquire equipment and
develop onsite procedures to produce sodium hypochlorite in the event that supply
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disruptions prevent deliveries of disinfection chemicals. Water systems will need to
establish or reinforce procurement systems that enable cash payments for necessary
supplies. Emergencies supplies that are cached at strategic location could become vital
for supporting personnel during the weeks or months of a pandemic. In addition, a
“wellness system” will be necessary for screening employees for illness and isolating
healthy employees. In 2004, eight major water and wastewater organizations formed the
Water Sector Coordinating Council (WSCC) to reduce water sector vulnerabilities. One
of the 14 focus issues for the WSCC is pandemic influenza (American Water Works
Association, 2007).
Business continuity planning (BCP) is a comprehensive, proactive planning
process that ensures that an entity remains functioning during and following emergencies
(ASIS, 2005; Security and Prosperity Partnership, 2007). BCP includes strategies,
procedures, and resources used by an organization to respond, recover and resume
operations in the event of substantial disruptive incidents (Moore, 2000). Continuity of
operations (COOP) planning specifically describes preparation, response and recovery
actions that are necessary to ensure that critical services or products are produced and
delivered during and following specified emergencies (FEMA, 2007). American Water
Works Association Research Project 2929 defined business continuity for water systems
as, “activities that ensure that the water utility is able to continue its business of providing
water services to its customers until normal business functions assume a state of
normalcy” (AWWARF, 2006).
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II. PURPOSE
This project involved an investigation of water utility preparations for pandemic
influenza in the United States. Another objective of the project was determining “best
practices” for water utility continuity of operations during pandemics. The final project
objective was to develop a template plan for water utility pandemic influenza continuity
of operations planning. The main focus of this plan is maintaining operations and
protecting employees.
This culminating experience project also resulted in the development of a draft
pandemic continuity of operations plan for the City of Dayton’s Division of Water
Supply and Treatment. A separate general template plan will be developed for other
divisions within the City of Dayton Water Department. For security reasons, these two
plans were not attached to the culminating experience manuscript.
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III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The World Health Organization, the United States government and health
departments across the United States have developed Pandemic Flu response plans or
protocols. In 1999 the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) tasked states to
prepare plans for pandemic influenza and provided guidelines (USDHHS, 2007). In
May, 2006 the United States Government’s Homeland Security Council released the
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan. In April, 2007 the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released “Pandemic Influenza Best Practices
and Model Protocols” for use by state, local, tribal and territorial personnel when
developing best practices for pandemic plans or training programs (US DHS, 2007). In
July, 2007 the Department of Health and Human Services issued the “One Year
Summary of National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan (USDHHS,
2007).
The main goals of the U.S. government’s response plan for pandemic influenza
are to limit the spread of a pandemic; mitigate disease, suffering, and death; sustain
infrastructure, and lessen the impact on the economy and society (CDC, 2007). An effort
is being made to produce enough vaccine within six months of a pandemic to inoculate
the entire U.S. population. The U.S. government has contracted with six manufacturers
to achieve this goal by 2011 and to stockpile pandemic vaccine doses ahead of time for
20 million people (USDHHS, 2007).
In 1998, President Clinton issued Presidential Directive 63 that identified water as
one of the nation’s critical infrastructure sectors (USDHS memo, 2006). In September,
2006 the U.S. DHS released the “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and

11

Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources”. This guide listed water
as one of seventeen Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources sectors. Each sector
collaborates with the Department of Homeland Security and sector-specific government
agencies (US DHS, 2006).
In May 2007, the U.S. DHS released “Water - Critical Infrastructure and Key
Resources Sector-Specific Plan as input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan”
(USDHS, 2007). U.S. government plans emphasize the need for critical infrastructure
sectors, including water, to prepare continuity of operations plans for pandemic influenza
and other hazards. Continuity of operations (COOP) planning or plans have written
procedures that systems or business can use to plan or respond to emergencies that
threaten continuation of essential operations. These plans identify critical components
for continuity of operations; identifying and protecting essential personnel, cross training
of employees, securing alternate supplies, ensuring emergency power sources, and
maintaining critical functions.
The July, 2007 federal government summary of the national pandemic influenza
plan stated that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) is responsible for
preparing the water sector for pandemic influenza by, “engaging federal, state, and local
partners in order to develop and promote the establishment of mutual aid and assistance
agreements…”(USDHHS, 2007). In addition, President Bush has tasked USEPA to
assist the nation’s critical drinking water and wastewater infrastructure, collectively
known as the water sector, to maintain operations in the event of an influenza pandemic
(U.S. DHS, 2007). The USEPA, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA),
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the CDC, and various other agencies have issued fact sheets about Pandemic Influenza
and preparedness sheets that discuss business continuity.

Public Health Agency Planning For Pandemic Influenza
State and local health department pandemic influenza plans were also reviewed
for this project. Occasionally these plans made passing references to critical
infrastructure or public water supply. Usually, the only reference to drinking water was a
mention for a need to stockpile bottled water for staff. One plan stated, “work with
public water system, local public health, (et al.) to assure safety of water supply”
(Minnesota Department of Public Health, 2006). The South Carolina Department of
Health and Environmental Control web site had a brief reference to potential labor
shortages, “Absenteeism may affect critical supplies such as water and electric…” (South
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, 2007).
Pandemic influenza preparation is a relatively new area of emergency preparation
for water systems. Pandemic influenza preparation is not specifically covered in
American Water Works Association (AWWA) or AWWW Research Foundation
(AWWARF) books and manuals released as of October 2007. The OEPA released its
first public document for water system pandemic influenza preparation in late 2006. This
document is a two page questionnaire for water and wastewater plant owners and
operators. The OEPA does not include pandemic influenza in the template plan for
Drinking Water Supply Emergency Plan that was developed for public water systems
(OEPA web page, 2007).
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It is considered unlikely that properly treated drinking water can serve as a mode
of transmission for the H5N1 virus. However, very little literature exists for this subject.
Literature that discusses drinking water treatment and other viruses, such as Norwalk-like
and Hepatitis A, is readily available (Chalapati et al., 1988; Salvato, 2003; American
Water Works Association, 1999).
Some bodies of water could be contaminated by dead birds or the feces of
infected birds. Chicken feces are sometimes used as a cheap protein source for fish farms
in Asia. Conventionally treated water should not pose a health risk even if the water
source is an open reservoir that is accessed by infected water birds (Cooperative Research
Centre, 2007). A Netherlands study of Avian Influenza Virus infection via water also
concluded that the risk of drinking water transmission is negligible (Achijven et al.,
2005).
According to a review of evidence by the World Health Organization it appears to
be unlikely that H5N1 can be transmitted through effectively treated drinking water or
sewage (WHO, 2006). It is believed that traditional methods of water treatment,
coagulation and filtration followed by disinfection, will reduce any avian influenza virus
present in the water to insignificant numbers. The avian influenza virus has an outer
protein envelope that is susceptible to damage by oxidants such as chlorine. This would
destroy the infectivity of the virus (WHO, 2006). The United States Department of
Agriculture and the Environmental Protection Agency conducted research which
indicated that typical chlorine levels used by public water systems are adequate to
inactivate H5N1 virus. Filtration is also effective for removing the virus (USEPA, 2007).
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Continuity of Operations Planning by Water Systems
Government agencies emphasize the need for critical infrastructure sectors such
as water to prepare plans for continuity of operations. However, few water utilities
address continuity of operations in their emergency response plans (American Water
Works Association, 2006). The USEPA and the OEPA encourage water utilities to
prepare for supply disruptions and employee shortages in the event of pandemic influenza
(OEPA, 2007). The USEPA is working with the Departments of Homeland Security and
Health and Human Services to give water system workers priority access to vaccines and
antiviral drugs. In the event of a pandemic influenza outbreak, water and sewer systems
would experience decreased staffing levels because of illness. Ensuring that enough
employees are available to perform essential services is seen as the most significant
factor for maintaining continuity of operations (American Water Works Association,
2006).
Existing software products could be used by water utilities to develop continuity
of operations plans. These products include RAMSAFE, Phoenix, and Disaster
Recovery Systems (Westby & Saldanha, 2004). One of the objectives of the American
Water Works Association Research Foundation Project 2929 was to identify best
practices for water utility emergency plans and planning programs (AWWARF, 2006).
The project investigated business continuity planning in the water sector but did not
investigate pandemic influenza preparedness.
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IV. METHODS
This project included a survey of medium and large water systems in Ohio to
determine the extent of preparations for pandemic flu. It was decided to only survey
medium and large water systems due to considerations of data manageability and the
belief that small systems were not likely to have pandemic influenza plans. Water system
size was determined from Ohio Environmental Protection Agency records for the number
of people supplied with water (Ohio EPA, 2007). The survey was approved for exempt
status by the Wright State University Institutional Review Board. Data from the survey
was accumulated for descriptive statistical analysis of the current state of preparedness of
water systems in Ohio.
Surveys were delivered by mail and/or email to a total of 86 medium and large
water systems. For purposes of this study, water systems that served a population in the
range of 20,000 to 99,999 were designated as medium size. Water systems that served a
population of at least 100,000 were characterized as large systems. Survey results were
grouped by these system size ranges; 20,000 – 49,999, 50,000 - 99,999, 100,000-199,999,
and greater than 199,000.
Most of the surveys were sent via mail. Some surveys were emailed to contacts at
larger water systems if an email recipient was identified as likely to respond to the
survey. Surveys were delivered by mail or email to a total of 86 medium and large water
systems. A copy of the survey is attached in Appendix B.
An effort was made to collect pandemic continuity of operation plans along with
returned surveys, through requests to water utilities, and through internet searches. These
plans were to be collected for comparison with utility industry and federal government
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standards for continuity of operations to determine best practices for water utility
continuity of operations during pandemics. Benchmarks for water system continuity of
operations and public health preparedness were established from critical areas identified
by the USEPA and the American Water Works Association.
Information for this project was also gathered from presentations delivered at
water industry conferences and seminars. Phone conversations were held with key
personnel in water systems that have written pandemic influenza continuity of operations
plans or were currently working on a plan. Other discussions were held with public
health officials and emergency preparedness experts to verify critical areas for pandemic
influenza preparedness. The relationship between public health preparedness and critical
infrastructure, especially drinking water, was one of the areas examined.
Existing pandemic flu plans were reviewed to determine applicability and
adaptability for inclusion in a template plan for water utility pandemic continuity of
operations. Some of the essential components for this template were also determined
from USEPA and Department of Homeland Security documents. Critical infrastructure
continuity of operations check lists in business continuity documents were used to verify
that the template included necessary elements.
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V. RESULTS

Ohio Water System Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
A total of 50 (58%) completed pandemic influenza preparedness surveys were
returned in September and October, 2007 from medium and large Ohio water systems.
Forty-six publicly owned water systems and four privately owned systems returned
surveys. One completed survey indicated that it served a population (9500) less than the
target size of at least 20,000. This survey was not included in data summaries. Although
public records indicated that five systems were in the two largest system categories,
surveys were received from six systems for each of these categories. It is possible that
the number of surveys received was greater than the number of pre-identified systems,
five for each category, because these systems actually serve more customers than are
indicated in Ohio EPA online records.
One surveyed utility indicated that the local health department “would handle”
their pandemic influenza planning. Eighty-eight percent of the targeted systems returning
surveys indicated that they either have a plan, in some cases incorporated into their main
emergency response plan (ERP), or they intend to develop a plan. Twelve percent of the
systems indicated that they did not have a plan or an intention to develop a plan. Two
systems reported that they address one potential impact of pandemic influenza, staffing
reductions in their existing emergency response plans, but did not indicate having a plan
that addressed other areas of pandemic influenza planning, e.g. social distancing.
Only eight percent of surveyed water systems had participated in training related
to pandemic influenza planning and response. A majority of systems, 86 percent,
indicated an interest in pandemic influenza preparedness training. Interest in training
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ranged from 67 percent for the 100,000 – 199,000 system category to 100 percent for the
50,000 – 99,999 system category.

Table 1 - Summary of Ohio Water System Survey
System Size

Have a plan.
Working on a
plan.
Intend to develop
a plan.
Pan Flu included
in ERP
Have
participated in
training.
Would
participate in
training
Number of
systems in
category
Public systems
returning surveys
Private systems
returning surveys
Total surveys
returned
Surveys returned
%

20,000
- 49,999

50,000
- 99,999

100,000
- 199,999

>200,000

Total

4

5

1

3

13

1

0

1

1

3

10

3

2

1

16

7

2

2

1

12

2

1

1

0

4

23

11

4

5

43

60

16

5*

5*

86

25

10

6

5

46

2

1

0

1

4

27

11

6

6

50

45%

69%

100%*

100%*

58%

* The number of surveys returned was greater than the number of systems in these
categories as identified in regulatory records.
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Figure 3 – Ohio Water Systems Currently Working On Pandemic Influenza Plan
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Figure 4 – Ohio Water Systems With Pandemic Influenza Plan

60%
50%
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30%
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20%
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Figure 5 – Ohio Water Systems Intending To Develop A Pandemic Influenza Plan
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Figure 6 – Ohio Water Systems: Pandemic Influenza Included in ERP

35%
30%
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Figure 7 – Ohio Water Systems – Pandemic Influenza Training Status

100%
Have
Participated
in Training

80%
60%
40%
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100200

>200

No Interest in
Training
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Existing Pandemic Influenza Plans
Thirteen of the fifty Ohio water systems returning surveys indicated that they had
existing pandemic influenza plans. Three of the four privately owned and operated water
systems indicated that they have existing pandemic influenza plans. One Ohio water
system provided a pandemic influenza plan for this project. Two systems from outside
Ohio allowed viewing of their pandemic influenza plans. Security concerns were voiced
by other water systems when requests to view their pandemic influenza plans were
denied.
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VI. DISCUSSION

United States Critical Infrastructure - Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
Federal and private Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR) sectors are
preparing for pandemic flu through sector specific councils. Water is one of the 17
identified sectors in the U.S. Homeland Security document Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key
Resources. There is a strong interdependence between water and other critical sectors.
Water is indispensable to other sectors but dependent on energy, transportation, and
chemical sectors to maintain operations. Although officially designed for the private
sector, which encompasses eighty-five percent of critical infrastructure resources, this
Guide provides pandemic planning and background materials that can be used by both
public and private critical infrastructure.
The main objective of the Guide is to stimulate CI/KR owner-operators to
“develop and integrate effective continuity of operations plans that ensure essential
services remain functional and essential goods remain available in the event of a
pandemic” (USDHS, 2006). Continuity of operations would be challenged by the
reduction in available workers due to illness, and disruption in the movement of people
and goods. The Guide categorizes pandemic influenza as an extreme challenge to
continuity of operations and promotes development of a Continuity of Operations Plan –
Essential (COP-E) as an extension of a Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) that
address emergencies like hurricanes or earthquakes. Basic Contingency Plans are
designed for routine challenges like power outages (see Figure 8).
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Figure 8 – Disaster Planning Continuum1

CONTINUITY OF
OPERATIONS
PLAN – Essential
(COP-E)
Pandemic Influenza,
Major Terrorism
Event

CONTINUITY OF
OPERATIONS
PLAN (COOP)
Hurricane,
Earthquake, Flood,
Localized Terrorism

BASIC
CONTINGENCY
PLAN
Localized power
outage, Plant Fire,
IT Failure

1

Adapted from Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006).

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for coordinating
pandemic influenza preparedness for the drinking water sector in the United States.
When the Guide is finalized, water sector specific information will be one of the annexes
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of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources. This information will identify specific measures that
water systems can undertake to maintain continuity of operations in the event of
pandemic influenza (USDHS, 2006).
Existing pandemic influenza template plans for water systems were not located in
the literature or through an online search of government documents. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) website has downloadable template
documents for continuity of operations plans with a separate pandemic influenza
appendix. These documents are designed for government agencies (USDHS, 2007). The
official government pandemic influenza preparedness website provides downloadable
planning documents and checklists for businesses.
The U.S. EPA and Ohio EPA have regulatory responsibility for drinking water
systems. As of February 1, 2008, neither agency provided pandemic influenza template
plans for water systems. The Ohio EPA has a Drinking Water Supply Emergency Plan
guidance document and template that water systems can use for development of system
specific emergency plans. The guidance document has a list of man-made or natural
disasters that water systems should prepare for but does not include pandemic influenza
or continuity of operations (OEPA, 2007).
The Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Ohio Emergency
Management Agency stress the need for individuals and families to prepare and store
emergency kits that contain food, water, and emergency supplies (USDHS, 2008 and
OEMA, 2008). The American Red Cross provides check lists and emergency kits that
households can use for emergency planning and preparation (American Red Cross,
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2008). Water systems should inform their customers of the importance of emergency kits
and encourage customers to store a three day supply of water to prepare for potential
supply disruptions. This information could be provided at water utility web sites or
disseminated through annual reports, water bills, or the USEPA required, Consumer
Confidence Report.

Public Health Agency Coordination with Critical Infrastructure
In the United States, state health departments have primacy for public health
programs. States delegate control of health programs to local health departments,
including pandemic influenza preparedness. State and local health departments have
developed pandemic influenza plans in all 50 states.
A search of public health department pandemic influenza plans revealed that the
only reference to public water supplies was usually in the section that listed prioritization
for vaccination and distribution of antiviral medications. Prioritization of vaccination and
distribution of antivirals follows guidance from the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services Pandemic Influenza Plan. Public utility personnel are in Tier 2, subtier
B (Table 2) for vaccinations and Tier 8 (Table 3) for distribution of antivirals (USDHS,
2005).
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Table 2 – Vaccination Prioritization
Priority Groups for Vaccination
Tier 1

Subtier A
-Health care
workers &
vaccinators

Tier 2

Subtier B
-Infants and
elderly with high
risk condition

Subtier A

Tier 4

-Pregnant
women
-Contacts of
infants and
immunocompromised
persons

Subtier D
-Public health
personnel critical
to pandemic
response
-Key government
positions

Subtier B

-Infants and elderly
-Persons 6 months to 64 years with
one high-risk condition

Tier 3

Subtier C

-Remainder of public health
workforce
-Public safety personnel (fire, police)
-Transportation personnel
-Telecommunications personnel
-Public utility personnel

-Key government health decision makers
-Funeral directors/embalmers
-Healthy persons 2 to 64 years not included in Tiers 1 - 3
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Table 3 – Prioritization for Distribution of Antiviral Medications

Priority Groups for Antiviral Medications
Tier

Group

1

Patients admitted to hospital with influenza

2

Health care workers with direct patient contact, and Emergency Medical
Services personnel directly involved with patient transport
Highest risk outpatients with influenza: immunocompromised persons and
pregnant women
Public health personnel critical to pandemic response, vaccinators, public
safety, and key government officials
Increased risk outpatients with influenza: children 12 to 23 months, persons
>65 years, persons with underlying medical conditions
Outbreak response in nursing homes and other residential settings

3
4
5
6
7

9

Health care workers in Emergency Department, Intensive Care Unit, dialysis,
and Emergency Medical Services settings
Critical infrastructure personnel in vaccination priority group Tier 2,
Subtier B, and health care workers without direct patient contact
Other outpatients with influenza not included in Tiers 1-8

10

Highest risk outpatients

11

Other health care workers with direct patient contact

8

Any other references to public water supplies or other critical infrastructure in
public health pandemic plans were usually quite brief. One plan stated, “Work with
public water supply, local public health, etc. to assure safety of water supply” (Minnesota
Dept. of Health, 2006). A September 2007 report by the Congressional Research Service
provided an analysis of state pandemic influenza preparedness plans authored by public
health officials. The report stated that only 11 of the state plans mentioned essential
services other than public health and healthcare services. Only seven of the plans
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mentioned continuity of essential services, including public utilities (Congressional
Research Service, 2007).
Public health agencies have continuity of operations plans to ensure that they will
be able to provide vaccinations, disease control, and other essential public health services
in the event of a pandemic. However, these essential services would be greatly impacted
if water or other utilities were disrupted. Major disruptions of water systems caused by
pandemics could potentially cause waterborne disease outbreaks that overwhelm health
care systems and public health services. Also, reductions in water system staffing caused
by pandemics could impact the repair of pumps or broken water pipelines. This could
cause loss of water service for public health facilities and impact the delivery of public
health services.

Water System Preparation for Pandemic Influenza in the United States
Water systems across the United States have developed plans or have started
preparing for pandemic influenza. The City of Denver water utility, which serves 1.2
million customers, started upgrading its emergency plan to include pandemic influenza in
2006.

Denver’s preparations included creating 37 emergency kits to be stored at water

treatment plants and key pumping stations. The kits contain enough food to feed one or
two people for three days, a sleeping bag, portable stove, cook kit, toilet paper, flashlights
and batteries, duct tape, rope, first-aid supplies, masks, gloves, and hand sanitizer. If the
utility is alerted of early stages of pandemic influenza, Denver’s plan includes crosstraining for key positions and a gradual shut-down of non-essential operations.

29

The City of Tacoma, Washington held a pandemic influenza training exercise in
December 2006. This exercise tested the utility’s response to a pandemic that reduced
staffing by 40 percent. After an evaluation of the exercise the City of Tacoma began a
cross training program for water utility employees. This program allows people in
different positions to fill in as water plant operators or other positions in an emergency
(AWWA, 2007).
The American Water Works Association (AWWA) convened a panel of
regulatory, water system and public health experts in early May 2006 to address water
utility preparedness for a flu pandemic. The panel’s discussions, reported in the June
2006 Journal of the AWWA, emphasized the importance of water utility preparations for
pandemic influenza and the need to partner with public health officials (AWWA, 2006).
Topics discussed included employees returning to work after recovering from influenza.
These employees will be vital for maintaining operations because of their acquired
immunity.
The USEPA and the Department of Homeland Security are jointly developing a
bird flu preparedness guide for water and wastewater systems. The Association of
Metropolitan Water Agencies (AMWA) developed a pandemic influenza reference guide
and checklist for water utilities. This document was released to AMWA members or
subscribers to the Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center (AMWA, 2007). The
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority and the South Florida Water Management
District have developed continuity of operations plans for pandemic influenza (Brown &
Caldwell, 2006).
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Water utilities should establish partnerships with public health agencies and
emergency officials to provide early warning of pandemic influenza and to enhance
preparation for pandemic influenza. Joint training exercises would benefit both water
systems and public health agencies. Water systems could benefit by obtaining
information from public health agencies about influenza protection measures and advance
knowledge of pandemic influenza outbreaks. Regular communications from public
health agencies about influenza-type illnesses could provide early notice of pandemic
influenza or potential bio-terrorism. Influenza-type illnesses can be a symptom of a
bioterrorism agent such as anthrax (Gensheimer et al., 2003).
Public health agencies could improve sections of their pandemic plans to enhance
support for water systems that provide drinking water and sanitation for the community.
This support could include advance planning of vaccinations for water system personnel.
These efforts by water systems and public health could improve the public health and
critical infrastructure components of pandemic influenza plans for both sectors.
To ensure effectiveness, pandemic influenza continuity of operations plans should
be flexible, easy to read, and capable of quick implementation. One half of utilities
surveyed in a 2006 American Water Works Association Research Foundation study said
their (all hazards) emergency plans were cumbersome. The time sensitive nature of
emergencies makes ease of use very important.
To prepare for pandemics or other emergencies water utilities should stockpile
emergency supplies, develop alternate sources or systems for power and treatment
chemicals; and acquire backup communication systems that could include radios with
multiple channels, all-in-one wireless communication devices, ham radios, and satellite
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internet service. To support telecommuting, water systems could buildup information
technology systems by increasing bandwidth, adding redundant servers, etc. Preparation
for pandemic influenza and establishing mutual aid agreements can prepare a water utility
for natural disasters or other emergencies that affect continuity of operations, including
terrorism.
Ensuring that enough employees are available to perform essential services is
seen as the most significant factor for maintaining continuity of operations. Cross
training of employees can provide a line of succession for management positions and
backup employees for operational positions. Encouraging seasonal influenza vaccination
is one measure that water systems can take to protect the health of their work force before
a pandemic. During pandemics social distancing, hygiene measures, and access to antivirals and virus specific vaccination will be crucial. Establishing a relationship in
advance with local public health officials could facilitate the distribution of anti-virals
and vaccines to water system personnel. Treatment of employees with influenza will be
problematic because the health care system will be overwhelmed by a pandemic.

Water System Preparation for Pandemic Influenza in Ohio
The Ohio EPA participated with public health and other agencies in a Pandemic
Influenza “functional” exercise conducted from January 24 – February 6, 2007. Six
pandemic influenza target areas were tested during the exercise; planning,
communications, isolation, incident management, medical surge, and public health
epidemiology and laboratory testing. During the exercise, Ohio EPA activated its
pandemic influenza plan and called several water systems to determine how those
systems would respond to various scenarios. At least one utility was contacted to
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determine how it would respond to a supply disruption for disinfection chemicals. The
Ohio EPA objective for this exercise was to maintain “safe” water supplies by
performing the agency’s essential functions, regulatory, outreach/assistance, and
administration (OEPA, 2007). This exercise is scheduled to be conducted again in
February 2008.
In 2007 utilities and agencies in Ohio began developing an Ohio Water Assistance
and Response Network (WARN) system. Utilities that register with Ohio WARN would
be prepared to assist or receive assistance from other utilities in the event of emergencies,
including pandemic influenza. This assistance could come in the form of providing
operators, equipment or supplies (Ohio Section AWWA, 2007).

However, mutual aid

would be hindered or prevented if pandemic influenza reduced the staff or supplies of
water utilities throughout Ohio.

Continuity of Operations Planning - Best Practices
The most critical issue for water utilities in the event of pandemic influenza is
maintaining continuity of operations. A reduced work force, and potential disruption of
supplies, chemicals, and energy would create major challenges to continuity of
operations. Other challenges could include inadequate bandwidth for telecommuting,
inadequate funding, and lack of preparation.
A review of literature, including water industry publications, indicated that few
water utilities address continuity of operations in their emergency response plans.
Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP) can be developed for different emergency
planning scenarios, including pandemic influenza. Essential elements of a COOP
include identification of essential functions, critical services, essential staff positions, and

33

critical resources. Essential functions for water systems include disinfection, filtration,
maintenance, repairs, and pumping. An example of criteria used to determine critical
services and necessary COOP components is presented in Table 4.

Table 4 – Example of Criteria for Developing Water Utility COOP
Components for Development of Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP)
Category
Examples
1. Identify Essential Functions
Provide potable water.
2. Identify Critical Services

Pump water
Disinfect water

3. Identify Critical Resources

Electricity for pumping
Chlorine for Disinfection

4. Identify Essential Personnel

Operators for treatment plant
Mechanics for repair of pumps

5. COOP Component

Emergency Generator Plan
Alternate Disinfectant Plan
Pandemic Influenza Plan

Major Considerations: Sufficient staff, supplies, energy, and chemicals.

Best practices for water system continuity of operations planning for pandemic
influenza were established through a review of literature and from critical areas identified
by the USEPA and the American Water Works Association. A summary of planning,
description, and action elements that incorporate best practices is listed in Table 5.
Sources of best practices are listed in appendix F.
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Table 5 – Best Practices For Pandemic Influenza COOP For Water Systems
Essential Elements of Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plans for Water Systems
Planning
Identify pandemic
coordinator and team

Description
Identify all planning
processes and define roles
and responsibilities.

Define essential services
and products.
Identify essential resources

Identify and prioritize
essential services, products
and personnel.
Delegate authorities and
lines of succession.

Determine essential
positions for maintaining
essential services.
Determine current status of
pandemic influenza in
region on daily basis.
Forecast worker absences.
Track employees who have
influenza and employees
that have recovered.
Plan for sustaining essential
functions, supplies,
material, and equipment.

Action
Designate Pandemic
coordinator.
Assign members to team.
List essential services.

Energy, chemicals, supplies. Develop alternate energy,
supplier and disinfection
plans.
Conduct thorough review of List primary, secondary and
all processes.
non-essential functions and
services in plan.
Use existing succession
Identify authorities and
plans or develop succession lines of succession in plan.
plans and lines of
succession.
Conduct review of all
Identify essential employees
positions.
and backups.
Monitor public health
information or establish
public health contact.
Monitor absences during
pandemic.
Keep records that track
employees that have
recovered from influenza.
Identify and propose actions
to protect and sustain
essential functions, supplies,
materials, equipment, and
systems support.
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Meet with public health
officials.
Monitor federal, state, and
local pandemic information
sites.
Develop forms for tracking
employees that have
recovered from influenza.
Cross train employees.
Retrain recently retired
employees.
Establish mutual aid
agreements.
Establish contracts for
temporary workers.
Determine trigger points for
prioritizing and ensuring
essential services.

Emergency
communications.

Sustain essential workers.

Assess needs and
requirements to protect and
sustain all employees.

Identify and assess
worker’s family care
requirements.

While respecting privacy
protections, identify and
assess issues for supporting
worker family care.
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Propose cost effective and
efficient preparedness
actions to stockpile essential
supplies, material, and
equipment.
Propose cost effective and
effective actions to sustain
essential functions.
Establish or update
emergency communication
procedures and maintain
equipment.
Ensure medical resources
for employees.
Encourage annual influenza
vaccinations for employees.
Establish telecommuting
and flexible work hour
policies.
Ensure IT is adequate for
telecommuting.
Establish hygiene control
procedures and train
employees.
Screen employee health.
Establish travel restriction
and teleconferencing
policies.
Establish policies for
sequestering critical staff.
Store emergency kits at key
locations.
Practice social distancing
(limit contacts with the
public by ending tours,
delay meter reading, etc.)
Develop pandemic
education information for
worker families and
disseminate.
Assess the number of
workers with school-age
children or other dependents
at home.
Identify other special needs
for family support.

Identify sick leave and pay
issues.

Employees may violate sick
leave policy caring for
family members, etc.
Paychecks may be delayed.
Shifts worked may exceed
union or employer rules.

Identify, document,
coordinate, and test “trigger
points” and actions.

Assess and identify
“triggering events” for each
action, such as changes in
WHO or U.S. government
alert matrix.

Assess and develop
exercise and training
programs.
Finalize, implement, and
review pandemic plan
periodically.

Develop human resource
policies to address
pandemic influenza issues:
excessive sick leave,
overtime, work rules, etc.

Assess what triggers a
change in the Federal, State,
and local pandemic alert
status.
Establish authorities,
triggers, and procedures for
activating and terminating
response and recovery
plans.
Keep records of actions &
expenditures.
Involve internal and
Conduct training at least
external partners in training. annually. Provide ICS
training for employees.
Finalize and implement the Implement initial
pandemic plan in a practical appropriate actions for the
and timely manner to ensure pandemic phase and
that the water system is
external trigger point.
fully prepared to respond
Continuously monitor and
and recover from a
assess implementation
potentially severe
actions to ensure staying on
pandemic.
target.
Adjust plans as necessary.
Review plans periodically,
at least every 90 days
initially and more
frequently as the pandemic
evolves.

Identify potential costs
associated with pandemic
influenza.

Evaluate budget impact of
pandemic influenza.

Mutual aid.

Discuss mutual aid with
neighboring utilities,
American Water Works
Association and regulators.
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Develop funding policies
and budget for pandemic
influenza planning and
response.
Develop mutual aid
agreements.

Pandemic Influenza Continuity of Operations Plan for Water Systems Template
A Pandemic Influenza Continuity of Operations Plan template for water systems
is included in appendix D. The template was developed for this project based on existing
plans and checklists from public health agencies, private industry, professional
associations, government and water systems. The template was designed so that action
items related to stages of pandemic influenza are in the beginning sections of the plan for
efficient access. Background information such as preparedness, hygiene, communication,
and educational materials, is in later sections or appendices.
The template can be used to develop a “stand alone” plan or it can be incorporated
as an appendix in an existing “all hazards” emergency plan. Because water systems are
unique and vary in size, the template is scalable and can be easily modified to fit local
circumstances. The checklist for pandemic influenza planning in appendix E can be used
to ensure that a system’s plan considers essential elements of preparedness, response, and
recovery. This checklist includes essential information from various regulatory, water
agency, and critical infrastructure documents.
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VII. CONCLUSION

Many of the larger water systems in Ohio that serve populations greater than
20,000 are preparing for the potential of an influenza pandemic. Twenty six percent of
the Ohio water systems responding to the project survey indicated that they have
developed a pandemic influenza preparedness plan. Eighty-eight percent of the surveyed
water systems either have a plan, are working on a plan or intend to develop a plan.
A majority of the surveyed water systems (86%) were interested in obtaining
training related to pandemic influenza preparedness and response. This training could be
arranged by professional organizations such as the American Water Works Association in
partnership with the Ohio or U.S. Environmental Protection Agencies. Training is
essential to ensure proper response to man-made and natural disasters that could result in
a significant disruption of service.
An informed public responds better in emergencies and is less likely to create
social disruption. Water systems should ensure that the customers in their community
receive emergency preparation information, especially regarding stockpiling water, food,
and emergency supplies. This information could be delivered as a water bill insert or in
the annual Consumer Confidence Report.
Ensuring that enough employees are available to perform essential services is
seen as the most significant factor for maintaining continuity of operations. Cross
training for essential positions, sequestering critical employees, vaccination and other
personal protection measures can help maintain an adequate level of staffing. These
measures represent multiple barriers to influenza caused disruptions which reflects the
multi-barrier concept that water systems use to ensure safe drinking water.
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Pandemic influenza plans for water systems could prove to be extremely valuable
tools for ensuring that water systems are able to continue treating and pumping safe water
in a sufficient quantity for drinking, sanitation, fire fighting, and commercial use during a
pandemic. In the event of a pandemic, communities will struggle with maintaining
healthcare systems, infrastructure, transportation systems, businesses, and the provision
of services. A disruption in the supply of drinking water would be extremely disastrous
for public health in a community already overwhelmed by pandemic influenza.
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APPENDIX B: Survey Cover Letter and Questionnaire
September 28, 2007
Subject’s Title
Subjects Organization
Dear Sir of Madam:
My name is Phil Van Atta. I am conducting research to determine best practices for
response and continuity of operations for water systems in the event of an influenza
pandemic. I work for the City of Dayton Water Department and I am a student in the
Master of Public Health (MPH) program at Wright State University.
A pandemic flu epidemic could cause widespread illness and fatalities, and create
major disruptions to the global economy and the operations of critical infrastructure,
including drinking water systems. I am conducting a survey of medium and large Ohio
water utilities to determine the status of preparations for a potential influenza pandemic.
This information will be used for background information for a MPH degree project.
You are invited to participate in this study. The questionnaire is expected to take less
than one minute to complete. Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary and
you may choose not to participate at any time without prejudice. There are no risks
anticipated from participating in this study. Your participation in this study implies
consent. Any information given will be reported in general terms related to the size of
population served. The source of information provided will remain anonymous. Your
water system will not be identified in the study.
It is requested that surveys be returned by October 19, 2007 in the postage paid
envelope. You may request a copy of the findings by submitting a request to me at the
address located below. It is anticipated that the report will be available after November
15, 2007.
If you have any general questions about giving consent or your rights as a research
participant, in this research study, you can call the Wright State University Institutional
Review Board at 775-4462. Thank you for your time and cooperation.
With regards,
Philip Van Atta
Principal Investigator
Wright State University - MPH
3235 Southern Blvd.
Kettering, Ohio 45429
(937) 775- 5555

Sara Paton, Ph.D.
Faculty Advisor
Wright State University
3235 Southern Blvd.
Kettering, Ohio 45429
(937) 775- 5555
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Water Utility Preparation for Pandemic Influenza Survey
I am conducting a survey of Ohio water utilities as part of a Master of Public Health
degree project. This project will include a paper that describes research of “best
practices” for water utility response, including continuity of operations, in the event flu
pandemic. This survey will take less than five minutes to complete. Your
participation in this survey is greatly appreciated. Please respond by October 19, 2007.
The identity of survey respondents will remain confidential.
Survey Questions
1. How many water customers are served by your utility?
>200,000 ____
100,000 – 199,999 _____
50,000 – 99,999 ______
20,000 – 49,999 ______
2. Is your water utility:
Publicly owned and operated? ____
Publicly owned and privately operated? _____
Privately owned and operated? ______
Other (please describe) _______________________________________________
3. Number of employees in your water utility? __________
4. Does your utility have a Pandemic Influenza Plan? Yes ____ No_____
5. What is the status of your utility’s preparation for Pandemic Influenza?
A Pandemic Flu Plan has been completed ____
Currently working on a Pandemic Flu Plan
Intend to develop a Pandemic Flu Plan ______
Pandemic Flu planning is part of the utility’s Emergency Response Plan ______
Other (please describe)______________________________________________
6. Have your employees participated in training that is related to Pandemic Flu
planning and response?
Yes _____
No_____
7. Would you or your employees be interested in participating in training that is related to
Pandemic Flu planning and response?
Yes _____
No_____
8. Comments (optional):
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APPENDIX C:

Public Health Competencies Achieved During Project

(Source: Competencies Project, Council on Linkages, April, 2001)

Domain 1: Analytic Assessment
Description of Completion
Water systems don’t have a template to facilitate
development of pandemic influenza plan.
2. Identifies relevant and
Literature search included recognized authorities for
appropriate data and
pandemic preparedness; WHO,CDC, FEMA, U.S.
information sources.
Dept. of Homeland Security, state and local health
agencies. Also researched and spoke to recognized
experts for water system preparedness; EPA, AWWA,
AMWA, and emergency preparedness coordinators.
3. Identify gaps in data
Discovered that public health agencies have scant
sources.
information about disruptions to water or other
utilities in their emergency plans.
4. Apply ethical principles
Confidentiality was maintained for all sources of
to the collection, etc. of data survey data.
and information.
5. Obtains and interprets
Project discussed how pandemic influenza planning
information regarding risks
and preparedness by water systems would benefit
and benefits to the
communities.
community.
Specific Competencies
1. Defines a problem

Domain 2: Policy Development/Program Planning Skills
Specific Competencies
Description of Completion
6. Collects, summarizes, and A survey was used to collect information from Ohio
interprets information
water systems to determine the status of preparedness
relevant to an issue.
for pandemic influenza.
7. Prepares and implements This project resulted in a template pandemic influenza
emergency response plans.
plan and a plan for the City of Dayton Water
Department.
8. Develops mechanisms to Best practices were developed to allow evaluations of
monitor and evaluate
pandemic influenza planning for water systems.
programs for their
effectiveness and quality.
9. Solicits input from
Phone discussions and email communications were
individuals and
conducted with emergency preparedness coordinators,
organizations.
public health officials, regulators, water associations,
and water system managers for this project.
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Specific Competencies
10. Presents information
accurately

Domain 3: Communication
Description of Completion
Sources of pandemic influenza information were the
World Health Organization and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention.

Domain 5: Community Dimensions
Specific Competencies
Description of Completion
11. Establishes and
Initiated partnership with local public health and
maintains linkages with key regulatory officials for pandemic preparedness.
stakeholders.
Domain 6: Basic Public Health Sciences
Specific Competencies
Description of Completion
12. Applies basic
Describes the relationship between drinking water,
environmental health
sanitation, and community health.
principals
13. Identifies and retrieves
Retrieved current scientific papers describing
current relevant scientific
pandemic influenza viruses and control of pandemics.
evidence.
Also, retrieved papers discussing the risk of influenza
viruses to drinking water sources.
Domain 8: Leadership and Systems Thinking
Specific Competencies
Description of Completion
14. Identifies internal and
Notes that disruptions of water systems caused by
external issues that may
pandemics could affect community health and
impact delivery of essential overwhelm public health services. Also, notes that loss
public health services.
of water in public health facilities would impact
delivery of public health services.
15. Facilitates collaboration Project initiated contacts with local public health and
of internal and external
regulatory officials for participation in future training
groups to ensure
and continued communication between stakeholders.
participation of key
stakeholders.
16. Promotes team and
Manuscript and template plan describe the importance
organizational learning.
of team training and ongoing education for water
system employees.
17. Contributes to
Best practices and a checklist were developed to
development,
monitor progress towards pandemic influenza
implementation, and
preparedness.
monitoring of organizational
performance standards.
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APPENDIX D: Water System Pandemic Influenza COOP Plan Template

The following template provides a structure for formulating a Pandemic Influenza
Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan based on guidelines from the Federal Emergency
Management Agency and information from other sources. Sources of pandemic
influenza information include the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
U.S. government pandemic influenza planning documents, including the pandemicflu.gov
website, and the World Health Organization.
The template can be used to develop a “stand alone” plan or it can be incorporated as
an appendix in an existing “all hazards” emergency plan. Some existing water system
plans can be used as sources of information for the pandemic influenza plan, e.g. “Strike
Plans” could be used to prepare for employee shortages. Water utilities can modify the
pandemic influenza template to meet their own needs and requirements. Divisions,
bureaus, laboratories, etc. within water utilities should develop specific actions relevant
to their unique activities. These action plans could be attached as annexes to an overall
Pandemic Influenza COOP.
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INFLUENZA PANDEMIC
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS
PLAN
Template
(Date)
City of _________ Water Department

(LOGO HERE)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL
DO NOT DUPLICATE

The City of __________ uses “For Official Use Only” for sensitive information.
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FOREWORD
The City of ___________ Water Department has operations that must be performed, or
rapidly and efficiently resumed, in an emergency. While the impact of an emergency
cannot be predicted, planning for operations under such conditions can mitigate the
impact of the emergency on our people, our facilities and our mission.
This continuity of operations plan (COOP) is designed to ensure that essential operations
can be performed during an influenza pandemic. These operations are the foundation
upon which the COOP is built. Continuity of Operations Plans for man-made or natural
disasters are important resources in providing essential services to our customers during
an emergency. Utilities can develop continuity of operations plans for all-hazards or for
specific situations, e.g. “Strike Plans”.
This template provides a structure for formulating a Pandemic Influenza Continuity of
Operations (COOP) Plan based on guidelines from the Federal Emergency Management
Agency and information from other sources. Sources of pandemic influenza information
include the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S. government
pandemic influenza planning documents, including the pandemicflu.gov website, and the
World Health Organization.
Water utilities are encouraged to modify this template to meet their own needs and
requirements. Divisions, bureaus, laboratories, etc. within water utilities should develop
specific actions relevant to their unique activities. These action plans could be attached
as annexes to the overall Pandemic Influenza COOP.
Necessary actions to take during different stages of pandemic influenza are located
in Section 3.0 of the plan. Later sections of the plan provide details and background
information.
This plan will be updated periodically as required to incorporate new
directives/strategies, new information technology, legislative changes, and procedural
changes based on lessons learned and best practices identified during exercises and actual
events. A full review, update, and approval of the plan will be conducted annually.
Revised plans will be distributed to the appropriate individuals.

Instructions and a template for developing general continuity of operations plans
can be downloaded at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) website
at: http://www.fema.gov/government/coop/index.shtm
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Flu pandemics occurred in 1918, 1957 and 1968. Public health and medical experts
at the World Health Organization (WHO) and elsewhere believe that another pandemic
could occur at any time. Pandemics occur when an influenza virus with severe health
effects undergoes genetic shift and human to human transmission occurs readily. There
is concern among public health officials that the avian influenza virus H5N1 could
undergo genetic changes and cause a pandemic.
Avian influenza viruses can spread between wild birds and domestic birds. Migratory
waterfowl can infect other birds directly or through fecal contamination of water used by
domestic birds. Currently, human avian influenza H5N1 cases are associated with close
contact with contaminated chickens and other poultry. There is some evidence indicating
that limited, non-sustained human-human transmission of H5N1 may have occurred. If
H5N1 undergoes genetic shift and becomes easily transmissible between humans,
pandemic influenza could spread rapidly. Because of increased global commerce and
international travel, diseases can now spread rapidly throughout the world which would
likely make a pandemic in the 21st century much more deadly than in the past.
Avian Influenza virus H5N1 has a high mortality rate. High mortality rates and rapid
human to human transmission differentiate pandemic influenza from “normal” seasonal
influenza. As of January 3, 2008 there were 348 human cases of H5N1 influenza world
wide with a death rate of 62%. These cases were mostly confined to Asia with other
cases in the Middle East and Africa. Public health officials track these H5N1 cases in
addition to tracking of “normal” seasonal influenza cases.
A Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) study of disease rates for a new
pandemic estimated that in the United States, 40 – 100 million people could be sickened.
The CDC study provided a “most likely estimate” death toll of 89,000 – 300,000, with
“best case” to “worst case” death toll range of 75,000 – 422,000.
It is considered unlikely that properly treated drinking water can serve as a mode of
transmission for the H5N1 virus. However, a pandemic caused by an influenza virus
could cause serious disruptions to the operations of drinking water systems. These
disruptions could be caused by staffing shortages, power disruptions, and shortages of
chemicals and other supplies. Protecting employee health is vital for continuing
operations, especially if another emergency, e.g. flooding, occurs during an influenza
pandemic. Ensuring continuity of operations for drinking water systems is crucial to
protect public health and safety, and to the economy of all communities.
Plans for maintaining essential functions and services in a pandemic influenza must
emphasize and implement procedures such as social distancing techniques, infection
control and personal hygiene, cross-training, and telecommuting. Protecting the health
and safety of employees must be a major focus of planning in order to ensure the
continuity of essential functions. Vaccines and antiviral medications will be important
tools for reducing the impact of influenza pandemics. However, a virus specific vaccine
might not be available in sufficient supply until more than 6 months after a pandemic
begins.
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1.1 Definitions (from www.pandemicflu.gov)
Avian (or bird) flu is caused by influenza viruses that occur naturally among wild
birds. The H5N1 avian flu virus is deadly to domestic fowl and can be transmitted
from birds to humans. There is no human immunity and no vaccine is available.
Pandemic influenza is virulent human flu that causes a global outbreak, or
pandemic, of serious illness. Because there is little natural immunity, the disease can
spread easily from person to person. Currently, there is no pandemic flu.
Seasonal (or common) flu is a respiratory illness that can be transmitted from person
to person. Most people have some immunity, and a vaccine is available.
Social Distancing are measures to increase the space between people and decrease
the frequency of contact among people.
Teleworking (or Telecommuting) is working from home or an alternate site and
avoiding commuting to the workplace through telecommunication (computer access).

2.0 PURPOSE
The purpose of this plan is to provide information and action steps for preparation,
response, and recovery in the event of pandemic influenza. This plan should be used in
conjunction with existing emergency plans.

3.0 PANDEMIC ALERT LEVELS AND ACTIONS
3.1 Pandemic Phases, Stages, and Water System Alert Levels
The (insert utility name) will implement its Pandemic Influenza COOP in response
to changes or “triggers” in the Federal Government (U.S.) Response Stages. Preparation
and actions are listed in Section 3.2 of this plan. Notification of various stages and
actions will follow the normal chain of command. Managers and supervisors will be
responsible for implementation following the normal chain of command. Details of
preparations and response actions are listed in later sections of this plan.
As of January 3, 2008 the World Health Organization list the current global pandemic
status as Phase 3 which corresponds with “No or very limited human-to-human
transmission”. The U.S. government classifies the current pandemic status as Stage 0
which relates to “New domestic animal outbreak in at risk country”. It is currently
believed that limited human to human transmission of H5N1 influenza may have
occurred in Asia. Table 1 shows the relationship between Federal Government Stages,
World Health Organization Phases, and suggested alert levels for water systems.
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Table 1 – Relation between Water System “Alert Levels” and Pandemic Stages/Phases
WHO
Phase 1 or
2: InterPandemic
Period

WHO
Phase 3
Pandemic
Alert
Period

WHO
Phase 4 or
5
Pandemic
Alert
Period

U.S.
Stage 0
New
Domestic
Animal
Outbreak
in At-Risk
Country

U.S.
Stage 1
Suspected
Human
Outbreak
Overseas

U.S.
Stage 2
Confirmed
Human
Outbreak
Overseas

Water
System
Planning
Stage

Water System
Pre-Pandemic
Alert Level A

WHO Phase 6
Pandemic Period

U.S.
Stage 3
Widespread
Human
Outbreaks
in Multiple
Locations
Overseas

U.S.
Stage 4
First
Human
Case in
North
America

Water System
Pandemic
Alert Level B

U.S.
Stage 5
Spread
throughout
United
States

U.S.
Stage 6
Recovery
and
Preparation
for
Subsequent
Pandemic
Waves

Water
System
Pandemic
Alert
Level C

Water
System
Preparation
for Next
Pandemic
Wave
Alert
Level D

Note: The relationship between WHO Phases 1 - 3 and U.S. Stages 0 - 2 is approximate.
WHO Phase 3 begins while U.S. Stage 0, “New domestic animal outbreaks in at-risk
country” is still in effect.

3.2 Pandemic Planning
Table 2, “Pandemic Planning and Preparation”, indicates suggested actions for water
systems to undertake in preparation for pandemic influenza. Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 in
section 3.3 list actions for water systems to undertake in response to various pandemic
stages.
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Table 2 – Pandemic Planning and Preparation
Pandemic Planning and Preparation
(New domestic animal outbreak in at-risk country)
Responsible
Person or
Team

Water System Action
Identify critical functions that must be kept in operation.
Identify critical supplies, e.g. chlorine, necessary to
maintain safe water.
Identify essential personnel.
Identify cross training needs and conduct cross training.
Develop pandemic influenza plan.
Participate in pandemic influenza planning and exercises
with local public health and regulatory officials.
Consider developing mutual aid agreements.
Update Standard Operating Procedures for plant operations
and other essential functions.
Define roles and responsibilities for all personnel during a
pandemic.
Educate all employees regarding pandemic policy (changes
in work rules, etc.), infection control measures (hygiene
measures, use of N-95 masks, etc) and flu symptoms.
Plan for supply disruptions: Develop alternate treatment
chemicals, supplies, and power.
Acquire supplies for sanitizing and personal protection:
sanitizing stations, sanitizing agents, latex/vinyl gloves,
and N-95 masks.
Develop emergency supply kits (food, water, PPE) to
critical facilities.
Ensure IT system is capable for telecommuting and
provide secure access to appropriate employees.
Establish necessary pandemic policies: Emergency
communications, travel, social distancing, telecommuting,
sequestering critical staff on-site, screening employees for
influenza, sick leave (for sending employees home that
have exceeded sick leave limits or have no accrued sick
leave).
Encourage employees to receive annual influenza
vaccinations and to stay home when they have influenza.
Set up pandemic influenza surveillance notification system
with local public health officials.
Reserve funds for emergency purchases at increased costs.
Encourage employees and public to develop home
emergency kits (food, water, etc.) and plans.
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Completed

3.3 TRIGGERS – Water System Actions in Response to Pandemic Stages
Table 3 – Alert Level A – Pre-Pandemic Actions
Alert Level A – Pre-Pandemic Preparation
(Suspected human outbreaks overseas – Confirmed human outbreaks overseas)
Responsible
Person or
Actions
Completed
Team
Remind employees regarding pandemic policy (changes in
work rules, etc.) and infection control measures (hygiene
measures, use of N-95 masks, etc) and flu symptoms.
Review preparations for supply disruptions and staffing
shortages (cross training and alternate treatment chemicals,
suppliers, and backup power systems.
Set up sanitizing stations and provide work areas with
sanitizing agents, latex/vinyl gloves, and N-95 masks.
Distribute emergency supply kits (food, water, personal
protection equipment) to critical facilities.
Establish or finalize necessary pandemic policies:
Emergency communications, travel, social distancing,
telecommuting, sequestering critical staff on-site, screening
employees for influenza, sick leave (for sending employees
home that have exceeded sick leave limits or have no
accrued sick leave).
Encourage employees to receive annual influenza
vaccinations and to stay home when they have influenza.
Monitor pandemic status through pandemicflu.gov and local
public health.
Maintain contact with critical supply vendors, e.g. chlorine,
electric, gas, to determine their ability to deliver supplies.
Suspend travel outside state when human outbreaks are
confirmed.
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Table 4 – Alert Level B – Pandemic Actions
Alert Level B – Pandemic
(Widespread human outbreaks in multiple locations overseas
– First human cases in North America)
Responsible
Person or
Team

Actions
Communicate pandemic status, and provide infection control
and symptoms of flu refresher training to all employees.
Remind all employees to stay home when they have
influenza.
Implement influenza screening (based on symptoms) of
employees.
Suspend all travel.
Focus on conducting essential functions only.
Prepare to implement necessary pandemic policies for social
distancing, telecommuting, sequestering critical staff on-site,
screening employees for influenza, sick leave (for sending
employees home that have exceeded sick leave limits or
have no accrued sick leave).
Maintain contact with critical supply vendors, e.g. chlorine,
electric, gas, to determine their ability to deliver supplies.
Prevent access to facilities by non-employees unless
necessary.
Prepare for use of cross trained employees.
Review line of succession plans and update as necessary.
Continue to monitor pandemic status through
pandemicflu.gov and local public health.
Provide supplies at facilities for sequestering essential staff.
Document actions and additional expenses.
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Completed

Table 5 – Alert Level C – Pandemic Actions
Alert Level C – Pandemic
(Spread throughout North America)
Responsible
Person or
Team

Actions
Communicate pandemic status to all employees.
Focus on conducting essential functions only.
Remind all employees to stay home when they have
influenza.
Continue influenza screening (based on symptoms) of
employees.
Consider modifications of treatment to conserve chemicals
and energy.
Reassign staff to insufficiently staffed facilities.
Consider sequestering essential personnel at facilities.
Provide daily absentee reports to Manager.
Suspend all travel.
Eliminate all non-essential face to face meetings.
Provide transportation to employees as necessary.
Maintain contact with critical supply vendors, e.g. chlorine,
electric, gas, to determine their ability to deliver supplies.
Continue to monitor pandemic status through
pandemicflu.gov and local public health.
Document actions and additional expenses.
Keep records of employees that have recovered from
influenza. They will be vital for maintaining operations
because of their acquired immunity.
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Completed

Table 6 – Alert Level D – Pandemic Recovery and Preparation Actions
Alert Level D – Pandemic Recovery and Preparation
(Preparation for Subsequent Pandemic Waves)
Responsible
Person or
Team

Actions
Continue essential functions and evaluate reinstating nonessential activities.
Communicate pandemic status to all employees.
Stockpile essential supplies.
Allow necessary travel on a case by case basis.
Maintain contact with critical supply vendors, e.g. chlorine,
electric, gas, to determine their ability to deliver supplies.
Restock supplies at facilities for sequestering essential staff.
Evaluate response and update plans.
Continue to monitor pandemic status through
pandemicflu.gov and local public health.
Document actions and additional expenses.
Remind all employees to stay home when they have
influenza.
Keep records of employees that have recovered from
influenza. They will be vital for maintaining operations
because of their acquired immunity.
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Completed

4.0 PANDEMIC PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS
These assumptions are adopted from the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
Implementation Plan and Business Continuity Planning Assumptions for Influenza
Pandemics from the North American Electric Reliability Council.

4.1 GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS
1. An influenza pandemic will occur in the future but timing of the outbreak is
uncertain.
2.

Susceptibility to the pandemic influenza virus will be universal.

3. Efficient and sustained person-to-person transmission signals an imminent
pandemic.
4. The clinical disease attack rate will likely be 30 percent or higher in the overall
population during the pandemic. Illness rates will be highest among school-aged
children (about 40 percent) and decline with age. Among working adults, an
average of 20 percent will become ill during a community outbreak. Some
persons will become infected but not develop clinically significant symptoms.
Asymptomatic or minimally symptomatic individuals can transmit infection and
develop immunity to subsequent infection.
5. Of those who become ill with influenza, 50 percent will seek outpatient medical
care. With the availability of effective antiviral drugs for treatment, this
proportion may be higher in the next pandemic.
6. The number of hospitalizations and deaths will depend on the virulence of the
pandemic virus. Estimates differ about 10-fold between more and less severe
scenarios. Two scenarios are presented based on extrapolation of past pandemic
experience (Table 7). Planning should include the more severe scenario. Risk
groups for severe and fatal infection cannot be predicted with certainty but are
likely to include infants, the elderly, pregnant women, and persons with chronic
medical conditions.
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7. Rates of absenteeism will depend on the severity of the pandemic. In a severe
pandemic, absenteeism attributable to illness, the need to care for ill family
members, and fear of infection may reach 40 percent during the peak weeks of a
community outbreak, with lower rates of absenteeism during the weeks before
and after the peak. Certain public health measures (closing schools, quarantining
household contacts of infected individuals, “snow days”) are likely to increase
rates of absenteeism.
8. The typical incubation period (interval between infection and onset of symptoms)
for influenza is approximately two days.
9. Persons who become ill may shed virus and can transmit infection for up to one
day before the onset of symptoms. Viral shedding and the risk of transmission
will be greatest during the first two days of illness. Children usually shed the
greatest amount of virus and therefore are likely to post the greatest risk for
transmission.
10. On average, infected persons will transmit infection to approximately two other
people.
11. A pandemic outbreak in any given community will last about six to eight weeks
for each wave of the pandemic.
12. Multiple waves (periods during which community outbreaks occur across the
country) of illness could occur with each wave lasting two-three months.
Historically, the largest waves have occurred in the fall and winter, but the
seasonality of a pandemic cannot be predicted with certainty.
13. The stages of the pandemic should occur sequentially, though they may overlap or
occur so rapidly as to appear to be occurring simultaneously or being skipped.
For example, the pandemic could spread so rapidly that Federal Government
Response Stages 3 and 4 may be activated simultaneously or the status could
change directly from Stage 3 to 5.
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Table 7: Number of Episodes of Illness, Healthcare Utilization, and Death Associated
with Moderate and Severe Pandemic Influenza Scenarios in the United States*
Characteristic
Illness
Outpatient Medical Care
Hospitalization
ICU Care
Mechanical Ventilation
Deaths

Moderate Pandemic
(similar to 1957, 1968)
90 million (30%)
45 million (50%)
865,000
128,750
64,875
209,000

Severe Pandemic
(similar to 1918)
90 million (30%)
45 million (50%)
9,900,000
1,485,000
745,500
1,903,000

*Estimates based on extrapolation from past pandemics in the United States. Note that
these estimates do not include the potential impact of interventions not available during
the 20th century pandemics.

4.2 _ (Insert Water Utility Name) ASSUMPTIONS
(Sample text)
1. Source water pumping, complete water treatment, treated water pumping and
(other critical functions) will remain operational during a pandemic influenza
outbreak.
2. Alternate facilities may be activated for use during a pandemic to separate staff,
i.e. implement social distancing protocols. A pandemic influenza event does not
necessarily require the use of alternate facilities.
3. Essential functions, operations and support requirements will continue to be
people-dependent. Social distancing, hygiene, health screening and other
measures may need to be implemented to protect the utility’s work force.
4. Disruptions of power and supplies, transportation restrictions, and staffing
reductions could affect the performance of essential functions.
5. Water utilities must be prepared to rely on their own resources. The widespread
effects of pandemic influenza would impact mutual aid from other utilities.

5.0

PANDEMIC RESPONSE TEAM AND COORDINATOR

(Water utility name) has designated (insert name or position) as the Pandemic
Coordinator. The (insert utility name and position) shall serve as the Alternate
Pandemic Coordinator. (Insert name or position) will establish a Pandemic Response
Team (PRT) to anticipate the impacts of a pandemic on (utility name) and to assist with
developing strategies to manage the effects of a pandemic outbreak. Each Division (or
bureau or other category) shall establish and designate a representative to the PRT.
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6.0

ESSENTIAL OPERATIONS

6.1 Essential Functions
Table 8 is an example list of essential functions with associated employees. In order to
minimize the effects of a pandemic on staff and essential functions, (insert utility name)
will emphasize and implement procedures such as social distancing techniques, infection
control and personal hygiene, and cross-training. (Primary employees (currently perform
these functions) and backup employees (cross trained, recently retired, etc.) should be
determined as part of pandemic planning.)
Table 8: Example - Essential Functions and Supporting Information
Priority

1
2
2
3
4

7.0

Essential Function

Primary
Employees

Backup
Employees

Water Treatment
Pumping
Water Treatment and Pumping
Equipment Repair
Distribution System Water Testing
Equipment Maintenance

CRITICAL POSITIONS AND MINIMUM STAFFING LEVELS

7.1 Identification of Essential Positions and Skills
The (insert utility name) shall identify positions, skills, and personnel needed to continue
essential functions and services. Back-up personnel will also be identified and crosstrained. (The utility may decide to attach “Essential Personnel” stickers on the back of ID
badges for security and screening of non-essential personnel.)
Annex (insert if applicable) of the (insert utility name) COOP Plan identifies those
personnel needed to support continuity of operations in all-hazards scenarios.
Table 9: Example - Employees with Essential Positions and Skills
Position
(Back-up position)
Water Plant Operator
(Maintenance)
Laboratory Analyst
(Water Plant Operator)

Employee

Skills
Water Treatment
Laboratory
Plumbing
Can repair anything
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Certifications/
Qualifications
Water Operator III
Water Analyst I
Pump Repair License
Water Operator III
Water Analyst III

8.0

CROSS TRAINING AND ALTERNATE WORK ARRANGEMENTS

8.1 Cross Training
Employees will be cross-trained in advance of pandemics so that back-up workers are
available for essential functions. Employees in non-essential and essential positions will
be trained to perform essential tasks that are not part of their job description. Discussions
should be held with unions and human resource departments to prepare for these
situations. Table 9 provides a list of primary and backup employees.
8.2 Alternate Work Schedules
Regular work schedules may be modified in the event of a pandemic. Departments
should review normal work schedules and determine how they can be modified to
promote social distancing and continuity of operations. During pandemics, overtime is
probable but meal and rest periods will still be required. Notification periods in
collective bargaining agreements may be suspended.
8.3 Telework Policy
Telework, aka Telecommuting can be an integral part of plans and procedures to
maintain essential functions and services in an influenza pandemic. (insert utility name)
shall analyze its current IT capability for teleworking and identify which personnel can
perform essential functions by teleworking during a pandemic. (insert name or
position) shall develop and evaluate telework plans, procedures, and capabilities through
reviews, testing, post-incident reports, lessons learned, performance evaluations, and
exercises. Procedures shall be established to ensure that corrective action is taken on any
deficiency identified in the evaluation process.
(List pre-identified tasks and/or jobs) can be done remotely during a pandemic. (If
applicable state, “Employees in these positions and their alternates have been
enabled with the appropriate security to access electronic networks and work from
home.”) (If applicable, insert, attach or reference Telework Plan here.)

9.0 EMPLOYEE HEALTH PROTECTION
9.1 Vaccinations and Antiviral Medications
Employees should be encouraged to receive annual seasonal vaccinations. These
vaccinations could protect the health of their work force before a pandemic.
Establishing a relationship in advance with local public health officials could facilitate
the distribution of anti-virals and vaccines to water system personnel. Prioritization of
vaccination and antivirals distribution follows guidance from the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services Pandemic Influenza Plan. In accordance with guidance from
the Public utility personnel are in Tier 2, subtier B for vaccinations and Tier 8 for
antivirals distribution
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Antivirals must be taken within 48 hours of symptoms to be effective (CDC). The
current potential pandemic virus, H5N1 is resistant to amantadine and rimantadine, but
oseltamavir and zanamavir would probably be effective (pandemicflu.gov).
9.2 Personal Protective Equipment and Supplies to Stockpile
Advance training and “just-in-time” training should be provided to employees regarding
infection control measures. The following infection control supplies should be provided
or made available at all times to employees:
- Soap and paper towels within washrooms
- Soap and paper towels within kitchen areas
- Hand sanitizer stations at various work areas
- Tissues
- Disinfectant spray for surfaces
- Extra trash cans and garbage bags for tissue disposal
- Personal Protective Equipment: Vinyl/latex gloves, N95 masks
9.3 Basic Hygiene
Employees shall be educated and reminded of hygiene measures to prevent the spread of
disease:
- Cover coughs and sneeze with a tissue (or into shirt sleeve if necessary).
- During pandemics: Avoid hand shaking (use alternatives like nodding, elbow
bumping, etc.).
- Keep work area and home clean and disinfected.
- Stay home when ill.
- Wash hands often, especially before eating (or touching near mouth, nose or
eyes).
- Wash hands before and after smoking.
- Hand sanitizers are only effective if hands are not soiled.
9.4 Disinfection
During a pandemic workplace cleaning measures will be required on a daily basis to
minimize transmission of influenza virus through hard surfaces (counters, door knobs,
etc.). Thorough cleaning should be performed before disinfection, especially for the
work areas of an ill employee. Disinfectants that can inactivate viruses should be used.
Influenza viruses may live up to two days on surfaces. Employees should wear a mask
and gloves when cleaning and disinfecting. The gloves and masks should be discarded
afterwards. Hands must be washed and sanitized after the procedure.
9.5 Travel Restrictions and Social Distancing
Social Distancing are measures to increase the space between people and decrease the
frequency of contact among people. Travel will be restricted or eliminated according to
plans for alert levels A, B, and C.
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Alert Level A (confirmed human cases overseas) – Travel is restricted to in-state only.
Alert Level B and C (widespread human outbreaks in multiple locations overseas - first
human cases in North America) – All travel is suspended.
Alert Level D (preparation for next pandemic wave) – Necessary travel evaluated on
case by case basis.
9.6 Employee Influenza Screening
Supervisors may rely on observations of employee symptoms to determine if an
employee has influenza. These symptoms include:
- Fever
- Cough
- Sore throat
- Muscle aches
- Eye infections (conjunctivitis)
- Pneumonia
- Acute respiratory distress
9.7 Ill Employees
Employees with influenza symptoms should be isolated and sent home as soon as
possible to prevent the spread of influenza. When the employee’s condition improves to
the point where the employee no longer poses a health hazard to fellow employees, the
employee shall contact his or her supervisor and arrange for the employee’s return to
work.
Treatment of employees with influenza will be problematic because the health care
system will be overwhelmed by a pandemic. Records should be kept of employees who
have recovered from pandemic influenza. These employees will be vital for operations
because of their acquired immunity.

10.0 CHAIN OF SUPPLY
10.1 Essential Contract and Support Services and Other Interdependencies
To prepare for pandemic influenza:
Existing inventory will be supplemented to keep essential services functioning for 7 days
or more. Vendors of critical products and services shall be identified. Discussions with
vendors shall include vendor plans for ongoing services and/or shipments in the event of
absences, shortages, or disruptions in transportation systems. (insert utility name) shall
initiate pre-solicited, signed and standing agreements with contractors and other third
parties to ensure fulfillment of supply and service requirements.
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(Insert utility name) shall develop relationships with more than one supplier should a
primary contractor be unable to provide the required service. Table 10 is a sample chart
used to depict the Contractual Staff and other interdependencies necessary to perform
essential functions.

Table 10: Example - Essential Contractual Arrangement and Interdependencies
Essential Supply
or Service
Chlorine
Water Main Repair

Primary Contractor
And Contact Info.

Back-up Contractor
And Contact Info.

11.0 HUMAN RESOURCES & UNION CONTRACT ISSUES
Discussions should be held with unions and human resource departments to prepare for
alternate work arrangements that may be implemented during pandemics.

12.0 COMMUNICATION PLAN
Communications Plan
(insert utility name) shall develop a Communications Plan and mechanisms to provide
relevant information to internal and external stakeholders, including but not limited to
instructions for determining the status of agency operations and possible changes in
working conditions and operational hours.
(Insert plan or refer to location of existing Communications Plan)
According to the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Guidance,
workplace risk can be minimized through implementation of systems and technologies
that facilitate communication without person-to-person contact.

13.0 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY & NIMS
At the height of a pandemic wave, absenteeism may reach a peak of 40 percent. As
such, delegations of authority are critical. (insert utility name) shall plan for
delegations of authority that are at least three deep per responsibility to help assure
continuity of operations over an extended time period, i.e., 30-60-90 days.
All employees should receive National Incident Management System training.
Supervisors and managers should be certified at IC 300 and 400 levels.
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14.0 INDIVIDUAL AND FAMILY PANDEMIC PREPARATION
Essential personal should have family care succession plans in place to ensure that they
can report to work if schools are closed, family members are ill, etc. All employees
should receive educational materials that describe pandemic influenza protection
measures for families. These materials are in Appendix F of this plan.

15.0 PANDEMIC PREPARATION TRAINING
15.1 Testing, Training, Exercises
Testing, training, and exercising are essential to assessing, demonstrating, and improving
the ability of organizations to maintain their essential functions and services.
15.2 Social Distancing
(insert utility name) shall conduct annual tests, training, and exercises to ensure
sustainable social distancing techniques, including telecommuting capabilities, and to
assess the impacts of reduced staff on the performance of essential functions.
15.3 Tabletop, Functional, and Full-Scale Exercises
(insert utility name) shall conduct annual pandemic exercises (tabletop, functional, or
full scale) to examine the impacts of pandemic influenza on essential functions, to
familiarize personnel with their responsibilities, and to validate the effectiveness of
pandemic influenza COOP planning by senior leadership.
(Attach Testing, Training and Exercise Plan in appendix.)
15.4 Annual Awareness Training
(insert utility name) shall conduct annual awareness briefings specific to pandemic
influenza.

15.5 Cross-Training Successors and Back-up Personnel
(insert utility name) shall identify and train back-up personnel, by position, needed to
perform essential functions.

APPENDICES
(Note: Utilities can use manuscript Appendix E for the “Template Appendix A”.
Spreadsheets or tables with utility specific information should be developed and used for
Appendices B, C, D, and E. Materials for “Template Appendix F can be obtained from
public health agencies or public health web sites.)
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Template APPENDIX A - Water Utility Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist
(In Appendix E of manuscript.)
Template APPENDIX B – Essential Functions and Resources (Personnel, equipment,
supplies, power, and other requirements, e.g. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
Systems.)
Template APPENDIX C – Essential Personnel List (With qualifications, skills,
certifications, etc.)
Template APPENDIX D – Inventory of Supplies (Utility specific information)
Template APPENDIX E – Testing, Training, and Exercise Plan (Utility specific
information)
Template APPENDIX F – Educational Materials (Obtain from Local Public Health
Agency)
Frequently asked questions about pandemic influenza
Employee and family pandemic influenza protection measures.
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APPENDIX E: Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist

Water Utility Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist

The following checklist is a modified version of a pandemic flu checklists developed by the
United States Department of Health and Human Services and Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. It identifies specific activities that water utilities can take to prepare for a pandemic
flu event. This checklist can be modified to cover unique circumstances relating to your utility.
Some items on the checklist may be covered by existing all-hazards, emergency response plans.

Pandemic Response Coordinator: _________________________

Date: ________________

1.1 Plan for the impact of a pandemic on your water utility:
In
Not
Completed
Progress Started
Identify a pandemic coordinator and/or team with defined roles and responsibilities
for preparedness and response planning. Include input from all management levels
and staff that are involved in day-to-day operations.
Identify critical functions that must be maintained, e.g. disinfection.
Identify essential personnel functions and critical inputs needed to maintain
operations, including locations where they may be needed during a pandemic.
Ensure there is redundancy in terms of personnel (cross-training), materials
(chemical suppliers, equipment suppliers, etc.), communication (phones, radios,
etc.), information technology, and power (electric, gas). Establish contingency
agreements with other utilities (gas, electric) where feasible.
Identify key customers and customers with special needs, such as hospitals and
nursing homes, and ensure services can be provided.
Cross train employees to provide backups for critical positions. Train and prepare
an ancillary workforce (e.g. contractors and retirees). Develop mutual aid contacts
through with other utilities through a Water Agency Response Network (WARN) or
other means.
Develop and plan for scenarios likely to result in an increase or decrease in demand
on your facilities during a pandemic (Loss of tourism, consumers at home instead
of work, etc.)
Determine the potential impact of a pandemic on utility-related travel (e.g.
quarantines, border closures that limit availability of chemicals), including suppliers
who make deliveries. Encourage suppliers to develop their own pandemic
influenza continuity of operations plans.
Find up-to-date, reliable pandemic information from the local public health agency
and other sources. Make this information available to all personnel.
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Establish an emergency communications plan and revise it periodically. The plan
should include identification of key contacts (with back-ups), chain of
communications (including suppliers and key customers), and processes for
tracking and communicating utility operational status and status of employees.
Ensure public notification procedures are in place for potential scenarios.
Implement an exercise/drill to test your plan, and revise it periodically. Ensure that
exercises include the participation or cooperation of local health agencies,
emergency planning officials and the Environmental Protection Agency.
NOTES:
1.2 Plan for the impact of a pandemic on your employees and customers:
In
Not
Completed
Progress Started
Forecast and allow for employee absences during a pandemic due to factors such
as personal illness, family member illness, community containment measures and
quarantines, school and/or business closures, and public transportation closures.
Implement guidelines to limit the frequency and type of face-to-face contact (e.g.
hand-shaking, meetings, office layout, shared workstations) among employees
and between employees and customers. Take into consideration delivery
personnel who would interact with employees. (See CDC recommendations.)
Encourage and track annual inﬂuenza vaccination for employees. Consult local
public health pandemic coordinators regarding pandemic vaccination and
distribution of antiviral medications.
Evaluate employee access to and availability of healthcare services during a
pandemic, and improve services as needed.
Evaluate employee access to and availability of mental health and social services
during a pandemic, including corporate, community, and faith-based resources,
and improve services as needed.
Identify employees and key customers with special needs, and incorporate the
requirements of such persons into your preparedness plan.
NOTES:
1.3 Establish policies to be implemented during a pandemic:
In
Not
Completed
Progress Started
Establish policies for employee attendance, sick-leave absences and
compensation unique to a pandemic (e.g. non-punitive, liberal leave), including
policies on when a previously ill person is no longer infectious and can return to
work after illness.
Establish policies for ﬂexible worksite (e.g. telecommuting) and ﬂexible work
hours (e.g. staggered shifts). Take into account that longer shifts and onsite
sleeping accommodations may reduce potential exposure to key workers.
Consider needs and conditions (food, sleeping accommodations, family
arrangements, etc.) for sequestering on-site critical staff.
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Establish policies for preventing inﬂuenza spread at the worksite (e.g. promoting
respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette, sanitizer stations, disinfecting work areas
and break rooms, and prompt exclusion of people with inﬂuenza symptoms).
Establish policies for employees who have been exposed to pandemic inﬂuenza,
are suspected to be ill, or become ill at the worksite (e.g. infection control
response, immediate mandatory sick leave).
Establish policies for teleconferencing and videoconferencing to limit face to face
contact.
Establish policies for travel to affected geographic areas and guidance for
employees returning from affected areas (refer to CDC travel recommendations).
Set up authorities, triggers, and procedures for activating and terminating the
utility’s response plan.
1.4 Allocate resources to protect your employees and customers during a pandemic:
In
Not
Completed
Progress Started
Provide sufficient and accessible infection control supplies (e.g. alcohol sanitizer
stations, tissues, N-95 facial masks and receptacles for their disposal) at all workrelated locations.
Enhance communications and information technology infrastructures as needed to
support employee telecommuting and remote customer access.
Ensure availability of medical consultation and advice for emergency response.
NOTES:
1.5 Communicate to and educate your employees:
In
Not
Completed
Progress Started
Develop and disseminate programs and materials covering pandemic
fundamentals (e.g. signs and symptoms of inﬂuenza, modes of transmission),
personal and family protection and response strategies (e.g. hand hygiene, use of
N-95 masks, coughing/sneezing etiquette, contingency plans).
Anticipate employee fear and anxiety, rumors and misinformation and plan
communications accordingly.
Ensure that communications are culturally and linguistically appropriate.
Disseminate information to employees about your pandemic preparedness and
response plan.
Provide information for the at-home care of ill employees and family members.
Develop platforms (e.g. hotlines, dedicated websites) for communicating
pandemic status and actions to employees, vendors, suppliers, and customers
inside and outside the worksite in a consistent and timely way, including
redundancies in the emergency contact system.
Identify community sources for timely and accurate pandemic information
(domestic and international) and resources for obtaining counter-measures (e.g.
vaccines and antivirals).
NOTES:
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1.6 Coordinate with external organizations and help your community:
Completed

In
Progress

Not
Started
Collaborate with insurers, health plans, and major local healthcare facilities to
share your pandemic plans and understand their capabilities and plans.
Collaborate with local public health officials, Environmental Protection Agency
officials and/or emergency responders; participate in their planning and training,
share your pandemic plans, and understand their capabilities (e.g. surveillance)
and plans.
Communicate with local and/or state public health agencies and/or emergency
responders about the assets and/or services your utility may be able to contribute
to the community.
Share pandemic continuity of operations best practices with other utilities and
professional associations to improve community response efforts.

NOTES:
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APPENDIX F: Sources of Best Practices for Pandemic Influenza Continuity of
Operations Plans for Critical Infrastructure

Business Continuity for Water and Wastewater Utilities: How to Keep Your Utility in
Business and Operating in Times of Crisis seminar, August 15 – 16, 2007, Alexandria,
Virginia. American Water Works Association.
Business Continuity for Pandemic, Natural Disaster, and Terrorism webcast (2006).
American Water Works Association.
Business Continuity Guideline: A Practical Approach for Emergency Preparedness,
Crisis Management, and Disaster Recovery (2005). ASIS International.
http://www.asisonline.org.
Business Continuity Planning in the Event of an Influenza Pandemic: A Reference Guide
(2007). Association of Metropolitan Water Agency. http://www.amwa.net/.
Business Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist, version 3.5 (2005). U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services. http://www.pandemicflu.gov/index.html.
Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government and Pandemic Influenza Planning
(2007). State of California, Office of Emergency Services.
http://www.oes.ca.gov/Operational/OESHome.nsf/PDF/COOPCOG%20Document%20D
ownloads/$file/DP%20Pan%20Influenza%20.pdf
Continuity of Operations Planning for Pandemic Influenza Guidance (2006). U.S.
Department of Homeland Security. http://www.fema.gov/government/coop/index.shtm
Drinking Water Supply Emergency Plan (2003). Ohio Environmental Protection Agency.
http://www.epa.state.oh.us/ddagw/pwswebpg.htm#vol1.
Disaster Response and Recovery Planning for Water Systems: A Kit of Tools, Project
2929 (2006). American Water Works Association Research Foundation.
Exemplary Practices in Public Health Preparedness (2005). Rand Corporation.
www.rand.org/
Electric Sector Influenza Pandemic Planning, Preparation, and Response Reference
Guide (2006). North American Electric Reliability Council.
http://esisac.com/publicdocs/Influenza%20Pandemic%20Reference%20Guide.pdf.
Introduction to Continuity of Operations (COOP) on-line course (2007). U.S.
Department of Homeland Security.
http://www.training.fema.gov/EMIweb/IS/IS5471st.asp.
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National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan (May 2006). U.S.
Homeland Security Council.
Pandemic Influenza Continuity of Operations Guide & Template for San Francisco City
and County Agencies (June 2006). San Francisco Department of Public Health.
Pandemic Influenza - A Guide for Water and Wastewater Plant Owners and Operators.
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (2007).
http://www.epa.state.oh.us/ddagw/pwswebpg.htm/.
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources (Sept. 2006). U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Pandemic Influenza Best Practices and Model Protocols (April 2007). U.S. Department
of Homeland Security.
Pandemic Preparedness Planning Checklist for Utilities and Other Businesses (2007).
Public Service Commission of West Virginia.
http://www.psc.state.wv.us/PanInfo/PSCChecklist200701.pdf.
Project Approach for Disaster Response, Recovery and Business Continuity Planning for
Drinking Water Utilities (2004). Westby, K.& Saldanha, D. Coalfire Systems Inc.
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APPENDIX G: Pandemic Influenza Plans Reviewed For This Project
Alameda County (CA) Public Health Department – Pandemic Influenza Continuity of
Operations Guide and Template, 2006.
Alaska Division of Public Health – Pandemic Influenza Response Plan, 2007.
Boston Public Health Commission – Pandemic Influenza Plan, 2007.
Combined Health District of Montgomery County - Public Health Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness and Response Plan for Montgomery County, Ohio, 2006.
Greene County Combined Health District – Influenza Pandemic Response Plan, 2006.
Indiana State Department of Health – Pandemic Influenza Plan, 2006.
Indian Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services – Pandemic
Influenza Workbook, 2006.
King County (WA) Health Department – Pandemic Influenza Emergency Response
Manual, 2006.
Maine- Pandemic Influenza Plan, 2005.
Massachusetts – Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan, 2006.
Minnesota Department of Public Health (2006). Pandemic Influenza Plan (Supplement)
Technical Section K: Environmental Public Health, version 2.5, April 2006, p. 233.
Montana Department of Health and Human Services – Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
and Response Plan.
Monterey County (CA) Health Department – Pandemic Influenza Response Plan, 2005.
Nashville/Davidson County Metro Public Health Department – Pandemic Influenza
Response Plan, 2006.
Ohio Department of Health – Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan
(PIPRP), 2006.
Ohio Department of Health – Pandemic Influenza Tool Kit For Ohio Schools, 2007.
Preble County General Health District – Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response
Plan, 2006.
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San Francisco City and County – Pandemic Influenza Continuity of Operations Guide
and Template, 2006.
Santa Clara County Public Health Department - Your Guide to Preparing for Pandemic
Flu, 2007.
Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America. - North American Plan for Avian
and Pandemic Influenza, 2007.
South Carolina – Pandemic Influenza Plan, 2006.
Toronto (Canada) – Pandemic Influenza Plan, 2006.
University of California, Davis Health System – Influenza Pandemic Emergency
Response and Business Continuity Plan, 2006.
U.S. Homeland Security Council – National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, 2005.
U.S. Homeland Security Council -National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
Implementation Plan, 2006.
World Health Organization – Global Influenza Preparedness Plan, 2005.
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